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Abstract. Program families can produce a (potentially huge) number
of related programs from a common code base. Many such programs
are safety critical. However, most verification techniques are designed
to work on the level of single programs, and thus are too costly to ap-
ply to the entire program family. In this paper, we propose an efficient
game semantics based approach for verifying open program families, i.e.
program families with free (undefined) identifiers. We use symbolic rep-
resentation of algorithmic game semantics, where concrete values are
replaced with symbolic ones. In this way, we can compactly represent
program families with infinite integers as so-called (finite-state) featured
symbolic automata. Specifically designed model checking algorithms are
then employed to verify safety of all programs from a family at once and
pinpoint those programs that are unsafe (respectively, safe). We present
a prototype tool implementing this approach, and we illustrate it with
several examples.
1 Introduction
Software Product Line (SPL) [5] is an efficient method for systematic develop-
ment of a family of related programs, known as variants (valid products), from
a common code base. Each variant is specified in terms of features (statically
configured options) selected for that particular variant. While there are different
implementation strategies, many popular SPLs from system software (e.g. Linux
kernel) and embedded software (e.g. cars, phones) domains [16] are implemented
using a simple form of two staged computation in preprocessor style, where the
programming language is extended with conditional compilation constructs (e.g.
#ifdef annotations from C preprocessor). At build time, the program family
is first configured and a variant describing a particular product is derived by
selecting a set of features relevant for it, and only then the derived variant is
compiled or interpreted. One of the advantages of preprocessors is that they are
mostly independent of the object language and can be applied across paradigms.
Benefits from using program families (SPLs) are multiple: productivity gains,
shorter time to market, and greater market coverage. Unfortunately, the com-
plexity created by program families (variability) also leads to problems. The
simplest brute-force approach to verify such program families is to use prepro-
cessor to generate all valid products of an SPL, and then apply an existing
single-program verification technique to each resulting product. However, this
approach is very costly and often infeasible in practice since the number of pos-
sible products is exponential in the number of features. Therefore, we seek for
new approaches that rely on finding compact mathematical structures, which
take the variability within the family into account, and on which specialized
variability-aware verification algorithms can be applied.
In this work, we address the above challenges by using game semantics mod-
els. Game semantics [1,12] is a technique for compositional modelling of program-
ming languages, which gives models that are fully abstract (sound and complete)
with respect to observational equivalence of programs. It has mathematical ele-
gance of denotational semantics, and step-by-step modelling of computation in
the style of operational semantics. In the last decade, a new line of research
has been pursued, known as algorithmic game semantics, where game semantics
models are given certain kinds of concrete automata-theoretic representations
[10,6,14]. Thus, they can serve as a basis for software model checking and pro-
gram analysis. The most distinctive property of game semantics is composition-
ality, i.e. the models are generated inductively on the structure of programs. This
is the key to achieve scalable (modular) verification, where a larger program is
broken down into smaller program fragments which can be modeled and verified
independently. Moreover, game semantics yields a very accurate model for any
open program with free (undefined) identifiers such as calls to library functions.
In [7], a symbolic representation of algorithmic game semantics has been pro-
posed for 2nd-order Idealized Algol (IA2). It redefines the (standard) regular-
language representation [10] at a more abstract level by using symbolic values
instead of concrete ones. This allows to give a compact representation of pro-
grams with infinite integers by using finite-state symbolic automata. Here, we
extend the symbolic representation of game semantics models, obtaining so-
called featured symbolic automata, which are used to compactly represent and
verify safety properties of program families.
Motivating Example. To better illustrate the issues we are addressing in this
work, we now present a motivating example. In Table 1 is shown a simple pro-
gram family M that contains two #if commands. They increase and decrease the
local variable x by the value of a non-local expression n, depending on the en-
abled features. The program uses features F = {A,B} and we assume it has the
following set of valid configurations K = {A∧B ,A∧¬B ,¬A∧B ,¬A∧¬B}. For
each valid configuration a different single program can be generated by appropri-
ately resolving #if commands. For example, the single program corresponding
to the valid configuration A∧B will have both features A and B enabled (set to
true), which will make both assignment commands in #if-s to be present in the
program. Programs for A∧¬B and for ¬A∧B are different in one assignment
command only, the earlier has the feature A enabled and the command x := x +n,
whereas the latter has the feature B enabled and the command x := x − n. Pro-
grams corresponding to all valid configurations are illustrated in Table 1. Thus,
to verify our family M we need to build and analyze models of four distinct, but
very similar, programs.
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Program family M :
n : exp intn , abort : comabort `{A,B}
newint x := 0 in
#if (A) then x := x + n;
#if (B) then x := x − n;
if (x = 1) then abort : com
Config. A∧B :
n : exp intn , abort : comabort `
newint x := 0 in
x := x + n;
x := x − n;
if (x = 1) then abort : com
Configs. A∧¬B (¬A∧B):
n : exp intn , abort : comabort `
newint x := 0 in
x := x + n; (x := x − n; )
if (x = 1) then abort : com
Config. ¬A ∧ ¬B :
n : exp intn , abort : comabort `
newint x := 0 in
if (x = 1) then abort : com
Table 1: Motivating example: the program family M and its valid products
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(d) Model for ¬A∧B .
Fig. 1: Automata for valid products of M .
We show in Fig. 1, the standard regular-language representation of game
semantics for these four programs where concrete values are used [10]. We can
see that we obtain regular-languages with infinite summations (i.e. infinite-state
automata), since we use infinite integers as data type. Hence, they can be used for
automatic verification only if the attention is restricted to finite data types. For
example, the model for the product A∧¬B in Fig. 1c illustrates the observable
interactions of this term of type com with its environment consisting of free
identifiers n and abort . So in the model are only represented moves associated
with types of n and abort (which are tagged with superscripts n and abort ,
respectively) as well as with the top-level type com of this term. The environment
(Opponent) starts the execution of the term by playing the move run; when the
term (Player) asks for the value of n with the move qn , the environment can
provide any integer as answer. If the answer is 1, the abort is run; otherwise the
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(a) SA for A ∧ B .
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(b) SA for ¬A ∧ ¬B .
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(c) SA for A ∧ ¬B .
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[?X=X−M ∧X =1, runabort〉
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done
(d) SA for ¬A ∧ B .
Fig. 2: Symbolic automata for valid products of M .
term terminates successfully by reaching the accepting state (shown as double
circle in the model). Note that each move represents an observable action that
a term of given type can perform. Thus, for commands we have a move run
to initiate a command and a move done to signal successful termination of a
command, whereas for expressions we have a move q to ask for the value of a
expression and an integer move to answer the question q.
If we represent the data at a more abstract level and use symbolic values
instead of concrete ones, the game models of these four programs can be rep-
resented more compactly by finite-state symbolic automata (SA) as shown in
Fig. 2. Every letter (label of transition) contains a move and a Boolean condition
which represents a constraint that needs to be fulfilled in order the corresponding
move to be performed. Note that so-called input symbols of the form ?N are used
for generating new fresh symbolic names, which bind all occurrences of the sym-
bol N that follow in the play until a new input symbol ?N is met. The symbol X
is used to keep track of the current value of the local variable x . For example, the
answer to the question qn asked by the term for A ∧ ¬B in Fig. 2c now is a newly
instantiated symbol N . If the value of N is 1, the abort command is run. We say
that “X1 = 0∧X2 = X1+N ∧X2 = 1” is a play condition for the play in Fig. 2c:
[X1 = 0, run〉 · qn · N n · [X2 = X1 + N ∧ X2 = 1, runabort〉 · doneabort · done.
This play is obtained from: [?X = 0, run〉 · qn ·?N n · [?X = X + N ∧ X =
1, runabort〉 · doneabort · done, after instantiating its input symbols with fresh
symbolic names. We say that one play is feasible, only if its play condition is
satisfiable (i.e. there exist concrete assignments to symbols that make that con-
dition true). This can be checked by calling an SMT solver.
Now, by further enriching letters with feature expressions (propositional for-
mulae defined over the set of features), we can give more compact single repre-
sentation of the above related programs to exploit the similarities between them.
The feature expression associated with a letter denotes for which valid config-
4
start
[tt, ?X=0, run〉
[¬A∧¬B,X 6=1, done〉
[A, tt, qn 〉
[¬
A∧
B
, tt, q n
〉
[¬A∧¬B,X=1, runabort〉
?Nn
?Mn
[B
, ?
X=
X+
N ,
q
n 〉
[¬B, ?X=X+N ∧X 6=1, done〉
[¬B, ?X=X+N ∧X=1, runabort〉
[tt,
?X=
X−M ∧
X 6=1, d
one〉
[tt, ?X=X−M ∧X=1, runabort〉
doneabort
do
ne
Fig. 3: Featured symbolic automaton for the program family M .
urations that letter (in fact, the corresponding move) is feasible. Thus, we can
represent all products of M by one compact featured symbolic automaton (FSA)
as shown in Fig. 3, which is variability-aware extension of the symbolic automata
in Fig. 2. From this model, by exploring all states we can determine for each
valid product whether an unsafe behaviour (one that contains abort moves) can
be exercised. If we find such an unsafe play for a valid product, then we need to
check that the play is feasible. If its play condition is satisfiable, the SMT solver
will return concrete assignments to symbols which make that condition true.
In this way, we will generate a concrete counter-example for a valid product.
In our example, we can determine that the product ¬A ∧ ¬B is safe, whereas
products A∧B , A∧¬B , and ¬A∧B are unsafe with concrete counterexamples:
run ·qn ·1n ·qn ·0n ·runabort ·doneabort ·done, run ·qn ·1n ·runabort ·doneabort ·done,
and run ·qn ·−1n ·runabort ·doneabort ·done, respectively.
Remark. Alternatively, a program family can be verified by generating a so-
called family simulator [2], which is a single program where #if commands
(compile-time variability) are replaced with normal if commands and available
features are encoded as free (undefined) identifiers. Then the classical (single-
system) model checking algorithms [6,7] can be used to verify the generated
simulator, since it represents a single program. In case of violation, we will obtain
a single counter-example that corresponds to some unsafe products. However,
this answer is incomplete (limited) for program families since there might be
some safe products and also there might be other unsafe products with different
counter-examples. Hence, no conclusive results for all products in a family are
reported using this approach. For example, the simulator for the family M is:
n : exp int, abort : com,A : exp bool,B : exp bool ` newint x := 0 in
if (A) then x := x + n; if (B) then x := x − n; if (x = 1) then abort : com
If we generate a (game) model for this term and verify it using algorithms in [6,7],
we will obtain a counter-example corresponding only to the product A ∧ ¬B .
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This leads us to propose an approach that solves the general family-based
model checking problem: determine for each product whether or not it is safe,
and provide a counter-example for each unsafe product.
Contributions. In this paper, we make the following contributions:
– We introduce a compact symbolic representation, called featured symbolic
automata, which represent game semantics of so-called annotative program
families. That is, program families which are implemented by annotating
program parts that vary using preprocessor directives.
– We propose specifically designed (family-based) model checking algorithms
for verifying featured symbolic automata that represent program families.
This allows to verify safety for all products of an family at once (in a single
execution), and to pinpoint the products that are unsafe (resp., safe).
– We describe a prototype tool implementing the above algorithms, and we
perform an evaluation to demonstrate the improvements over the brute-force
approach where all valid products are verified independently one by one.
2 The Language for Program Families
The standard approach in semantics community is to use meta-languages for the
description of certain kinds of computational behaviour. The semantic model is
defined for a meta-language, and a real programming language (C, ML, etc) can
be studied by translating it into this meta-language and using the induced model.
We begin this section by presenting a meta-language for which algorithmic game
semantics can be defined, and then we introduce static variability into it.
Writing Single Programs. We consider the meta-language: Idealized Algol (IA)
introduced by Reynolds in [15]. It is a compact language which combines call-
by-name typed λ-calculus with the fundamental imperative features and locally-
scoped variables. We work with its second-order recursion-free fragment (IA2 for
short), because game semantics of this fragment has algorithmic properties.
The data types D are integers and booleans (D ::= int | bool). We have
base types B (B ::= expD | com | varD) and first-order function types T
(T ::= B | B → T ). The syntax of the language is given by:
M ::=x |v |skip |diverge | M opM | M ;M | if M thenM elseM |whileM doM
| M := M | !M | newD x :=v in M | mkvarDMM |λ x .M | MM
where v ranges over constants of type D , which includes integers (n) and booleans
(tt ,ff ). The standard arithmetic-logic operations op are employed, as well as the
usual imperative and functional constructs. Well-typed terms are given by typ-
ing judgements of the form Γ ` M : T , where Γ is a type context consisting of
a finite number of typed free identifiers. Typing rules are given in [1,15].
The operational semantics is defined by a big-step reduction relation: Γ `
M , s =⇒ V , s′, where Γ ` M : T is a term in which all free identifiers from
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Γ are variables, and s, s′ represent the state before and after reduction. The
state is a function assigning data values to the variables in Γ . Canonical forms
(values) are defined by V ::= x | v | λ x .M | skip | mkvarDMN . Reduction
rules are standard (see [1,15] for details). If M is a closed term (with no free
identifiers) of type com, then we abbreviate the relation M , ∅ =⇒ skip, ∅ with
M ⇓. We say that a term Γ ` M : T is an approximate of a term Γ ` N : T ,
written Γ ` M @∼ N , if and only if for all terms-with-hole C [−] : com, such that
` C [M ] : com and ` C [N ] : com are well-typed closed terms of type com, if
C [M ] ⇓ then C [N ] ⇓. If two terms approximate each other they are considered
observationally-equivalent, denoted by Γ ` M ∼= N .
Writing Program Families. We use a simple form of two-staged computation
to lift IA2 from describing single programs to program families. The first stage
is controlled by a configuration k , which describes the set of features that are
enabled in the build process. A finite set of Boolean variables describes the
available features F = {A1, . . . ,An}. A configuration k is a truth assignment (a
mapping from F to bool = {tt ,ff }) which gives a truth value to any feature. If a
feature A ∈ F is enabled (included) for the configuration k , then k(A) = tt . Any
configuration k can also be encoded as a conjunction of propositional formulas:
k(A1) ·A1 ∧ . . . ∧ k(An) ·An , where tt ·A = A and ff ·A = ¬A. We write K for
the set of all valid configurations defined over F for a program family. The set of
valid configurations is typically described by a feature model [5,16], but in this
work we disregard syntactic representations of the set K.
The language IA2 extends IA2 with a new compile-time conditional term for
encoding multiple variations of a program, i.e. different valid products. The new
term “#if φ thenM elseM ′” contains a presence condition φ over features F,
such that if φ is satisfied by a configuration k ∈ K then M will be included in
the resulting product, otherwise M ′ will be included. The new syntax is:
M ::= . . . | #if φ thenM elseM ′ φ ::= A ∈ F | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ
We add a new syntactic category of feature expressions (i.e. propositional logic
formulae over F), FeatExp(F), ranged over by φ, to write compile-time conditions
over features F. Well-typed term families are given by typing judgements of the
form Γ `F M : T , where F is a set of available features 1. Typing rules are those
of IA2 extended with a rule for the new construct:
Γ ` M : T
Γ `F M : T
Γ `F M : T Γ `F M ′ : T φ : FeatExp(F)
Γ `F #if φ thenM elseM ′ : T
The semantics of IA2 has two stages: first, given a configuration k compute
a single IA2 term without #if-s; second, evaluate the IA2 term using the stan-
dard IA2 semantics. The first stage of computation (also called projection) is
a simple preprocessor from IA2 to IA2 specified by the projection function pik
1 For the work in this paper, we assume that the set of features F is fixed and all
features are globally scoped.
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mapping an IA2 term family into a single IA2 term corresponding to the con-
figuration k ∈ K. The projection pik copies all basic terms of IA2 that are also
IA2 terms, and recursively pre-processes all sub-terms of compound terms. For
example, pik (skip) = skip and pik (M ; M
′) = pik (M ); pik (M ′). The interesting case
is for the compilation-time conditional term, where one of the two alternative
branches is included in the generated valid product depending on whether the
configuration k satisfies (entails) the feature expression φ, denoted as k |= φ. We
have: pik (#if φ thenM elseM
′) =
{
pik (M ) if k |= φ
pik (M
′) if k 6|= φ . The variant of a term
family Γ `F M : T corresponding to the configuration k ∈ K can now be defined
as: Γ ` pik (M ) : T .
3 Symbolic Representation of Game Semantics
In this section we first recall symbolic representation of algorithmic game se-
mantics for IA2 [7], and then we extend this representation for IA2.
Symbolic Models of IA2. Let Sym be a countable set of symbolic names, ranged
over by upper case letters X , Y , Z . For any finite W ⊆ Sym, the function
new(W ) returns a minimal symbolic name which does not occur in W , and sets
W := W ∪new(W ). A minimal symbolic name not in W is the one which occurs
earliest in a fixed enumeration X1,X2, . . . of all possible symbolic names. Let Exp
be a set of expressions, ranged over by e, inductively generated by using data
values (v ∈ D), symbols (X ∈ Sym), and standard arithmetic-logic operations
(op). We use a to range over arithmetic expressions (AExp) and b over boolean
expressions (BExp).
Let A be an alphabet of letters. We define a symbolic alphabet Asym induced
by A as follows: Asym = A∪{?X , e | X ∈ Sym, e ∈ Exp}. The letters of the form
?X are called input symbols. They represent a mechanism for generating new
symbolic names, i.e. ?X means letX = new(W ) inX . . .. We use α to range over
Asym . Next we define a guarded alphabet Agu induced by A as the set of pairs of
boolean conditions and symbolic letters: Agu = {[b, α〉 | b ∈ BExp, α ∈ Asym}.
A guarded letter [b, α〉 means that α occurs only if b evaluates to true, i.e.
if (b = tt) then α else ∅. We use β to range over Agu . We will often write only α
for the guarded letter [tt , α〉. A word [b1, α1〉· [b2, α2〉 . . . [bn , αn〉 over Agu can be
represented as a pair [b,w〉, where b = b1 ∧ b2 ∧ . . . ∧ bn is a boolean condition
and w = α1 · α2 . . . αn is a word of symbolic letters.
Now, we show how IA2 terms in β-normal form are interpreted by symbolic
regular languages and automata, which will be specified by extended regular
expressions R. Each type T is interpreted by a guarded alphabet of moves Agu[[T ]]
induced by A[[T ]], which is defined as follows:
A[[expD]]={q}∪A[[D]],A[[com]]={run,done},A[[varD]]={write(a), read, ok, a |a∈A[[D]]}
Agu
[[B
〈1〉
1 →...→B〈k〉k →B ]]
=
∑
1≤i≤k
Agu 〈i〉[[Bi ]] +A
gu
[[B ]]
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where A[[int]] = Z, A[[bool]] = {tt ,ff }, and + denotes a disjoint union of alphabets.
Function types are tagged by a superscript 〈i〉 to keep record from which type,
i.e. which component of the disjoint union, each move comes from. The letters in
the alphabet A[[T ]] represent moves (observable actions) that a term of type T
can perform. Each of moves is either a question (a demand for information) or an
answer (a supply of information). For expressions in A[[expD]], there is a question
move q to ask for the value of the expression, and values from A[[D]] to answer the
question. For commands, there is a question move run to initiate a command,
and an answer move done to signal successful termination of a command. For
variables, there are question moves for writing to the variable, write(a), which
are acknowledged by the answer move ok; and there is a question move read for
reading from the variable, which is answered by a value from A[[D]].
For any (β-normal) term, we define a (symbolic) regular-language which rep-
resents its game semantics, i.e. its set of complete plays. Every complete play
represents the observable effects of a completed computation of the given term.
It is given as a guarded word [b,w〉, where b is also called play condition. As-
sumptions about a play (computation) to be feasible are recorded in its play
condition. For infeasible plays, the play condition is inconsistent (unsatisfiable),
thus no assignment of concrete values to symbolic names exists that makes
the play condition true. If the play condition is inconsistent, this play is dis-
carded from the final model of the corresponding term. The regular expression
for Γ ` M : T , denoted as [[Γ ` M : T ]], is defined over the guarded alphabet:
Agu[[Γ`T ]] =
(∑
x :T ′∈Γ Agu 〈x〉[[T ′]]
)
+ Agu[[T ]], where moves corresponding to types of
free identifiers are tagged with their names.
The representation of constants is standard:
[[Γ `v :expD ]]=q · v [[Γ `skip :com]]=run · done [[Γ `diverge :com]]=∅
Free identifiers are represented by the so-called copy-cat regular expressions,
which contain all possible behaviours of terms of that type. For example:
[[Γ, x : expD
〈x ,1〉
1 → . . . expD〈x ,k〉k → expD〈x〉`x : expD〈1〉1 → . . . expD〈k〉k → expD ]]
= q · q〈x〉 · ( ∑
1≤i≤k
q〈x ,i〉 · q〈i〉·?Z 〈i〉 · Z 〈x ,i〉)∗·?X 〈x〉 ·X
When a call-by-name non-local function x is called, it may evaluate any of its
arguments, zero or more times, in an arbitrary order and then it returns any
allowable answer from its result type. Note that whenever an input symbol ?X
(letX = new(W ) inX . . .) is met in a play, the mechanism for fresh symbol
generation is used to instantiate it with a new fresh symbolic name, which binds
all occurrences of X that follow in the play until a new ?X is met which overrides
the previous one. For example, consider a non-local function f : expint〈1〉 →
expint. Its symbolic model is: q·q〈f 〉 ·(q〈f ,1〉 ·q〈1〉·?Z 〈1〉 ·Z 〈f ,1〉)∗·?X 〈f 〉 ·X . The play
corresponding to f which evaluates its argument two times after instantiating its
input symbols is given as: q ·q〈f 〉 ·q〈f ,1〉 ·q〈1〉 ·Z 〈1〉1 ·Z 〈f ,1〉1 ·q〈f ,1〉 ·q〈1〉 ·Z 〈1〉2 ·Z 〈f ,1〉2 ·
X 〈f 〉 ·X , where Z1 and Z2 are two different symbolic names used to denote values
of the argument when it is evaluated the first and the second time, respectively.
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[[op : expD
〈1〉
1 × expD〈2〉2 → expD ]] = q · q〈1〉·?Z 〈1〉 · q〈2〉·?Z ′〈2〉 · (Z opZ ′)
[[; : com〈1〉 × com〈2〉 → com]] = run · run〈1〉 · done〈1〉 · run〈2〉 · done〈2〉 · done
[[if : expbool〈1〉 × com〈2〉 × com〈3〉 → com]] = [tt , run〉 · [tt , q〈1〉〉 · [tt , ?Z 〈1〉〉·(
[Z , run〈2〉〉 · [tt , done〈2〉〉+ [¬Z , run〈3〉〉 · [tt , done〈3〉〉) · [tt , done〉
[[while : expbool〈1〉 × com〈2〉 → com]] = [tt , run〉 · [tt , q〈1〉〉 · [tt , ?Z 〈1〉〉·(
[Z , run〈2〉〉 · [tt , done〈2〉〉 · [tt , q〈1〉〉 · [tt , ?Z 〈1〉〉)∗ · [¬Z , done〉
[[:= : varD〈1〉 × expD〈2〉 → com]] = run · q〈2〉·?Z 〈2〉 · write(Z )〈1〉 · ok〈1〉 · done
[[! : varD〈1〉 → expD ]] = q · read〈1〉·?Z 〈1〉 · Z
cell
〈x〉
v = ([?X=v , read
〈x〉〉 ·X 〈x〉)∗ · (write(?X )〈x〉 · ok〈x〉 · (read〈x〉 ·X 〈x〉)∗)∗
Table 2: Symbolic representations of some language constructs
The representations of some language constructs are given in Table 2. Note
that letter conditions different than tt occur only in plays corresponding to “if”
and “while” constructs. In the case of “if” command, when the value of the first
argument given by the symbol Z is true then its second argument is run, other-
wise if ¬Z is true then its third argument is run. A composite term c(M1, . . . ,Mk )
built out of a language construct “c” and subterms M1, . . . ,Mk is interpreted by
composing the regular expressions for M1, . . . ,Mk and the regular expression for
“c”. Composition of regular expressions (o9) is defined as “parallel composition
plus hiding in CSP” [1]. Conditions of the shared (interacting) guarded letters in
the composition are conjoined, along with the condition that their symbolic let-
ters are equal [7]. The cell〈x〉v regular expression in Table 2 is used to impose the
good variable behaviour on a local variable x introduced using newD x :=v inM .
Note that v is the initial value of x , and X is a symbol used to track the current
value of x . The cell〈x〉v plays the most recently written value in x in response to
read, or if no value has been written yet then answers read with the initial value
v . The model [[newD x := v in M ]] is obtained by constraining the model of M ,
[[newD x ` M ]], only to those plays where x exhibits good variable behaviour
described by cell〈x〉v , and then by deleting (hiding) all moves associated with x
since x is a local variable and so not visible outside of the term [7].
The following formal results are proved in [7]. We define an effective alphabet
of a regular expression to be the set of all letters that appear in the language
denoted by that regular expression. The effective alphabet of a regular expres-
sion representing any term Γ ` M : T contains only a finite subset of letters
from Agu[[Γ`T ]], which includes all constants, symbols, and expressions used for
interpreting free identifiers, language constructs, and local variables in M .
Theorem 1. For any IA2 term, the set L[[Γ ` M : T ]] is a symbolic regular-
language over its effective (finite) alphabet. Moreover, a finite-state symbolic
automata A[[Γ ` M : T ]] which recognizes it is effectively constructible.
Suppose that there is a special free identifier abort of type com. We say that
a term Γ ` M is safe iff Γ ` M [skip/abort]@∼M [diverge/abort]; otherwise we
say that a term is unsafe. Hence, a safe term has no computation that leads
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to running abort. Let L[[Γ ` M : T ]]CR denotes the (standard) regular-language
representation of game semantics for a term M obtained as in [10], where concrete
values are used. Since this representation is fully abstract, and so there is a close
correspondence with the operational semantics, the following holds.
Proposition 1. A term Γ ` M : T is safe iff L[[Γ ` M : T ]]CR does not contain
any play with moves from A〈abort〉[[com]] , which we call unsafe plays.
The following result [7] confirms that symbolic automata (models) can be used
for establishing safety of terms.
Theorem 2. L[[Γ `M :T ]] is safe (all plays are safe) iff L[[Γ `M :T ]]CR is safe.
For example, [[abort : comabort ` skip ; abort : com]] = run · runabort · doneabort ·
done, so this term is unsafe.
Since symbolic automata are finite state, we can use model-checking tech-
niques to verify safety of IA2 terms with integers. The verification procedure
proposed in [7] searches for unsafe plays in the symbolic automata representing
a term. If an unsafe play is found, it calls an external SMT solver (Yices) to
check consistency (satisfiability) of its play condition. If the condition is con-
sistent, then a concrete counter-example is reported. We showed in [7] that the
procedure is correct and semi-terminating (terminates for unsafe terms, but may
diverge for safe terms) under assumption that constraints generated by any pro-
gram can be checked for consistency by some (SMT) solver.
Example 1. Consider the term family M from Introduction. The symbolic model
for the term A∧B is given in Figure 2a. The term asks for a value of the non-
local expression n with the move qn two times, and the environment provides
as answers symbols N and M . When the difference N − M is 1, then abort
command is run. The symbolic model in Fig. 2a contains one unsafe play:[?X =
0, run〉 · qn ·?N n · [?X = X + N , qn〉·?M n · [?X = X −M ∧ X = 1, runabort〉 ·
doneabort · done, which after instantiating its input symbols with fresh names
becomes: [X1 = 0, run〉 · qn · N n · [X2 = X1 + N , qn〉 · M n · [X3 = X2−M ∧
X3 = 1, run
abort〉 · doneabort · done. An SMT solver will inform us that its play
condition (X1 = 0∧X2 = X1+N ∧X3 = X2−M ∧X3 = 1) is satisfiable, yielding
a possible assignment of concrete values to symbols: X1 = 0,N = 1,X2 =
1,M = 0, and X3 = 1. Thus, the corresponding concrete counter-example will
be: run · qn · 1n · qn · 0n · runabort · doneabort · done. Similarly, concrete counter-
examples for terms A∧¬B and ¬A∧B can be generated; and it can be verified
that the term ¬A∧¬B is safe. uunionsq
Symbolic Models of IA2. We extend the definition of guarded alphabet Agu as
the set of triples of feature expressions, boolean conditions and symbolic letters:
Agu+f = {[φ, b, α〉 | φ ∈ FeatExp(F), b ∈ BExp, α ∈ Asym}
Thus, a guarded letter [φ, b, α〉 means that α is triggered only if b evaluates to
true in valid configurations k ∈ K that satisfy φ. That is, every letter is labelled
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with a feature expression that defines products able to perform the letter. As be-
fore, we write only α for [tt , tt , α〉. A word [φ1, b1, α1〉 · [φ2, b2, α2〉 . . . [φn , bn , αn〉
over Agu+f can be written as a triple [φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn , b1 ∧ . . . ∧ bn , α1 ·. . .·αn〉. Its
meaning is that the word α1 · . . . ·αn is feasible only if the condition b1 ∧ . . . ∧ bn
is satisfiable, and only for valid configurations that satisfy φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn . Regular
languages and automata defined over Agu+f are called featured symbolic.
We can straightforwardly extend the symbolic representation of all IA2 terms
in the new setting by extending all guarded letters with the value tt for the first
(feature expression) component. Now, we are ready to give representation of the
compile-time conditional term:
[[Γ `F #if φ thenM elseM ′]] = [[Γ ` M ]] o9 [[Γ ` M ′]] o9 [[#if]]φ
where o9 is the composition operator, and the interpretation of the compile-time
conditional construct parameterized by the feature expressions φ is:
[[#if : com〈1〉 × com〈2〉 → com]]φ =
run · ([φ, tt , run〈1〉〉 · done〈1〉 + [¬φ, tt , run〈2〉〉 · done〈2〉) · done
That is, the first argument of #if (which is M ) is run for those configurations
that satisfy φ, whereas the second argument of #if (which is M ′) is run for
configurations satisfying ¬φ.
Again, the effective alphabet of [[Γ `F M : T ]] for any IA2 term is a finite
subset of Agu+f[[Γ`FT ]]. Hence, the automata corresponding to [[Γ `F M : T ]] is effec-
tively constructible, and we call it featured symbolic automata (FSA). Basically,
an FSA is a SA augmented with transitions labelled (guarded) with feature ex-
pressions. We denote it as FSA[[Γ `F M : T ]] = (Q , i , δ,F ), where Q is a set of
states, i is the initial state, δ is a transition function, and F ⊆ Q is the set of
final states. The purpose of an FSA is to model behaviours (computations) of
the entire program family and link each computation to the exact set of prod-
ucts able to execute it. From an FSA, we can obtain the model of one particular
product through projection. This transformation is entirely syntactical and con-
sists in removing all transitions (moves) linked to feature expressions that are
not satisfied by a configuration k ∈ K.
Definition 1. The projection of FSA[[Γ `F M : T ]] = (Q , i , δ,F ) to a config-
uration k ∈ K, denoted as FSA[[Γ `F M : T ]] |k , is the symbolic automaton
A = (Q , i , δ′,F ), where δ′ = {(q1, [b, a〉, q2) | (q1, [φ, b, a〉, q2) ∈ δ ∧ k |= φ}.
Theorem 3 (Correctness). FSA[[Γ `F M : T ]] |k= A[[Γ ` pik (M ) : T ]].
Example 2. Consider the term family M from Introduction. Its FSA is given in
Fig. 3. Letters represent triples, where the first component indicates which valid
configurations can enable the corresponding move. For example, we can see that
the unsafe play obtained after instantiating its input symbols with fresh names:
[tt ,X1 = 0, run〉 · [A, tt , qn〉 · N n · [B ,X2 = X1+N , qn〉 ·M n · [tt ,X3 = X2−M ∧
X3 = 1, run
abort〉 · doneabort · done, is feasible when N = 1 and M = 0 for the
configuration A∧B . uunionsq
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4 Model Checking Algorithms
The general model checking problem for program families consists in determining
which products in the family are safe, and which are not safe. The goal is to
report all products that are not safe and to provide a counter-example for each.
A straightforward but rather naive algorithm to solve the above problem is
to check all valid programs individually. That is, compute the projection of each
valid configuration, generate its model, and verify it using standard algorithms.
This is so-called brute force approach, and it is rather inefficient. Indeed, all
programs (exponentially many in the worst case) will be explored in spite of
their great similarity. We now propose an alternative algorithm, which explores
the set of reachable states in the FSA of a program family rather than the
individual models of all its products. We aim to take advantage of the compact
structure of FSAs in order to solve the above general model checking problem.
A model checker is meant to perform a search in the state space of the FSA
(Q , i , δ,F ) and to indicate safe and unsafe products. This boils down to checking
if an ‘unsafe’ state q ′ ∈ Q with q [φ,b,run
abort〉−→ q ′ is reachable in the FSA. This can
be accomplished with a Breadth-First Search (BFS) in the FSA that encounters
all states that are reachable from the initial state and checks whether one of
them is ‘unsafe’. In this way, the BFS finds the shortest unsafe play for any
product. The algorithm is shown in Fig. 4. It maintains a reachability relation
R ⊆ Q × P(K) that stores a set of pairs (q , px ) where q is marked as a visited
state for the valid products from px ⊆ K; a queue Queue that keeps track of
all states that still have to be visited (explored), and a set of counterexamples
unsafe. R is first initialized by the initial state i ∈ Q that is reachable for all valid
products, i.e. (i ,K) ∈ R. For (q , px ) ∈ R, we write R(q) for the set of products
px . Queue supports the operations: remove which returns and deletes the first
element of Queue, and put which inserts a new element at the back of Queue.
In Queue along with each state q , we store a trace, trace(q), that shows how q
is reached from the initial state i . For each visited state, it is checked whether
that state is unsafe (line 6). Each time an unsafe state q is reached, the pair
(e, px ′) = complete(q , px , trace(q)) is added to unsafe where: ‘e’ is a complete
counter-example generated by looking at the trace kept on Queue along with q
and by finding the shortest trace from q to an accepting state (by performing an
embedded BFS); and px ′ is the corresponding set of unsafe products. Note that e
represents the shortest unsafe play for the products in px ′. At each iteration, the
BFS calculates the set new of unvisited successors of the current state, filtering
out states and products that are already visited in R. Assuming that we have
a transition q
[φ,b,α〉−→ q ′ and the source state q is reachable by products in px ,
the target state q ′ is reachable for products in {k ∈ px | k |= φ}. Given an FSA
as input, the algorithm in Fig. 4 calculates all reachable states from the initial
state i . When the search finishes and unsafe is empty, the algorithm returns
true; otherwise it returns false and the set unsafe.
After having found an unsafe state, our algorithm will continue exploration
until the entire model is explored. Since the aim is to identify violating products,
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Input: FSA[[Γ `F M ]] = (Q , i , δ,F ) and valid configs. K
Output: true if M is safe; otherwise false plus a set of counterexamples
1. R := {(i ,K)}
2. Queue := [(i ,K)]
3. unsafe := ∅,Kunsafe := ∅
4. while (Queue 6= [])do
5. (q , px ) := remove(Queue)
6. if (q is UNSAFE) then
7. (e, px ′) := complete(q , px , trace(q))
8. unsafe := unsafe ∪ (e, px ′),Kunsafe :=Kunsafe ∪ px ′
9. Queue :=Queue − {(q , px ) ∈ Queue | px ⊆ Kunsafe}
10. else new :=
{
(q ′, px ′\R(q ′)) |q[φ,b,m〉−→ q′,px ′={k∈px |k|=φ,k 6∈Kunsafe},px ′\R(q′)6=∅
}
11. while (new 6= ∅)do
12. (q ′, px ′) := remove(new)
13. R(q ′) :=R(q ′) ∪ px ′
14. put((q ′, px ′),Queue)}
15. end
16. end
17. end
18. return(unsafe 6= ∅), unsafe
Fig. 4: Model Checking Algorithm for verifying safety based on Specialized BFS
it can ignore products that are already known to violateKunsafe=∪(e,px)∈unsafepx .
In the BFS, this can be achieved by filtering out states with products px ⊆
Kunsafe as part of the calculation of new . This can only eliminate newly discov-
ered states, not those that are already on the queue. States on the queue can be
filtered out by removing elements (q , px ) for which px ⊆ Kunsafe (line 9).
Compared to the standard BFS, where visited states are marked with Boolean
visited flags and no state is visited twice, in our algorithm visited states are
marked with sets of products (for which those states are visited) and a state can
be visited multiple times. This is due to the fact that when the BFS arrives at a
state s for the second time, such that R(q) = px , (q , px ′) ∈ new , and px ′ * px ,
then s although already visited, has to be re-explored since transitions that were
disallowed for px during the first visit of q might be now allowed for px ′.
The complete verification procedure for checking safety of term families is
described in Fig. 5. In each iteration, it calls the BFS from Fig. 4 and finds some
safe products and (unsafe) products for which a genuine (consistent) counter-
example is reported. To prevent the model checker to consider these products
(for which conclusive results are previously found), the BFS in the next iteration
is called with updated arguments, i.e. only for configurations with no conclusive
results. We first show that the projection pik commutes with our “lifted” verifi-
cation procedure, which is applied directly on the level of program families.
Theorem 4 (Correctness). Γ ` pik (M ) is safe iff FSA[[Γ `F M ]] |k is safe.
14
The procedure checks safety of a given term family Γ `F M : T .
1 The BFS from Fig. 4 is called with arguments: FSA[[Γ `FM ]] and K.
2 If no unsafe play is found, terminate with answer SAFE.
3 Otherwise, find Kunsafe = ∪(e,px)∈unsafepx . For all products in K\Kunsafe report
that they are SAFE. The mechanism for fresh symbol generation is used to
instantiate all input symbols in the unsafe plays e, and their conditions are
tested for consistency.
4 If the condition of some play e from (e, px ) ∈ unsafe is consistent, report the
corresponding products px as UNSAFE with counter-example e. Otherwise
generate K′ ⊆ Kunsafe that contains all products associated with inconsistent
plays. Then go to Step 1, i.e. call BFS with arguments: FSA[[Γ `FM ]] without
all inconsistent unsafe plays and K′.
Fig. 5: Verification procedure (VP)
As a corollary of Theorems 2, 3, 4 we obtain that the VP in Fig. 5 returns
correct answers for all products. Moreover, it terminates for all unsafe products
by generating the corresponding unsafe plays. The VP will find the shortest
consistent unsafe play t for each unsafe product after finite number of calls to
the BFS, that will first find all inconsistent unsafe plays shorter than t (which are
finitely many [7]). However, the VP may diverge for safe products, producing in
each next iteration longer and longer unsafe plays with inconsistent conditions.
5 Implementation
We have extended the prototype tool developed in [7] to implement the VP in
Fig. 5. That tool [7] converts any single (IA2) term into a symbolic automata
representing its game semantics, and then explores the automata for unsafe plays.
The extended tool takes as input a term family, and generates the corresponding
FSA, which is then explored based on the procedure described in Fig. 5. The
tool is implemented in Java along with its own library for working with featured
symbolic automata. We have also implemented algorithms for elimination of -
letters and for removing all unreachable states. The tool calls an external SMT
solver Yices to determine consistency of play conditions. We now illustrate our
tool with an example. The tool, further examples and detailed reports how they
execute are available from: http://www.itu.dk/~adim/symbolicgc.htm.
Consider the following version of the linear search algorithm, Linear3.
x [k ] : varintx [−], y : expinty , abort : comabort `{A,B,C}
newint i := 0 in newint j := 0 in
#if (A) then j := j + 1;
#if (B) then j := j − 1;
#if (C ) then j := j + 2;
newint p := y in
while (i < k) do {
if (x [i ] = p) && (j = 1) then abort else j := j − 1;
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family-based approach brute-force approach
Bench. | K | Time Max Final Time Max Final
Intro 4 0.34 s 25 9 0.78 s 68 28
Linear3 8 1.34 s 51 9 3.86 s 336 72
Linear4 16 2.34 s 57 9 7.28 s 720 144
Linear5 32 4.50 s 63 9 16.27 s 1482 288
Fig. 6: Performance comparison for verifying program families.
i := i + 1 } : com
The term family contains three features A, B , and C , and hence 8 products can
be produced. In the above, first depending on which features are enabled some
value from -1 to 3 is assigned to j , and then the input expression y is copied into
the local variable p. The non-local array x is searched for an occurrence of the
value stored in p. If the search succeeds j -times (for j > 0), abort is executed.
The arrays are implemented in the symbolic representation by using a special
symbol (e.g., k with an initial constraint k > 0) to represent the length of an
array. A new symbol (e.g., I ) is also used to represent the index of the array
element that needs to be de-referenced or assigned to (see [7] for details). If we
also want to check for array-out-of-bounds errors, we can include in the repre-
sentation of arrays plays that perform abort moves when I ≥ k . For simplicity,
we do not take into consideration the array-out-of-bounds errors in this example.
The FSA for the above term family is shown in Appendix B. If the value
read from the environment for y occurs j -times (for j > 0) in the array x ,
then an unsafe behaviour is reported. Hence, all products for which the value
assigned to j is less than 1 are safe: ¬A∧¬B ∧¬C , ¬A∧B ∧¬C , and A∧B ∧
¬C . All other products are unsafe. For example, for products A ∧ B ∧ C and
¬A∧¬B ∧C (for which j is set to 2) the tool reports a counter-example that
corresponds to a term with an array of size k = 2, where the values read from the
environment for x [0], x [1], and y are the same, i.e. the following counter-example
is generated: run·qy ·0y ·readx [0] ·0x [0] ·readx [1] ·0x [1] ·runabort ·doneabort ·done. This
counter-example is obtained after 2 iterations of the VP, and it corresponds to a
computation which runs the body of ‘while’ two times. In the first iteration, an
inconsistent unsafe play is found (its condition contains J = 2∧J = 1, where the
symbol J tracks the current value of j ). A consistent counter-example is obtained
in the first iteration for products A∧¬B ∧¬C and ¬A∧B ∧C (for which j is
1), whereas for A∧¬B ∧C (j is assigned to 3) in the third iteration. The tool
diverges for safe terms, producing longer and longer (inconsistent) unsafe plays
in each next iteration.
We ran our tool on a 64-bit IntelrCoreTM i5 CPU and 8 GB memory.
All times are reported as averages over five independent executions. For our
experiments, we use four families: Intro is the family from Table 1 in Sec-
tion 1; Linear3 is the above family for linear search with three features; Linear4
is an extended version of Linear3 with one more feature D and command:
16
#if (D) then j := j + 3; and Linear5 is Linear4 extended with one additional
feature E and command: #if (E ) then j := j−2. We restrict our tool to work with
bounded number of iterations (10 in this case) since the VP loops for safe terms.
For Linear4 the tool reports 13 unsafe products with corresponding counter-
examples, whereas for Linear5 21 unsafe products are found. Fig 6 compares the
effect (in terms of Time, the number of states in the maximal model generated
during analysis Max, and the number of states in the final model Final) of
verifying benchmarks using our family-based approach vs. using brute-force ap-
proach. In the latter case, we first compute all products, generate their models,
and verify them one by one by using the tool for single programs [7]. In this
case we report the sum of number of states for the corresponding models in all
individual products. We can see that the family-based approach is between 2.3
and 3.6 times faster (using considerably less space) than the brute-force. We
expect even bigger efficiency gains for families with higher number of products.
6 Related work and Conclusion
Recently, many so-called lifted (family-based) techniques have been proposed,
which lift existing single-program analysis and verification techniques to work
on the level of program families (see [16] for a survey). This includes lifted type
checking [3], lifted model checking [4], lifted data-flow analysis [9], etc.
Classen et al. have proposed featured transition systems (FTSs) in [4] as the
foundation for behavioural specification and verification of variational systems.
An FTS, which is feature-aware extension of the standard transition systems,
represents the behaviour of all instances of a variational system. They also show
how the specifically designed family-based model checking algorithms for verify-
ing FTSs against fLTL properties are implemented in the SNIP model checker.
The input language to SNIP is fPromela, which is a feature-aware extension of
the well-known SPIN’s language Promela. In this work, we also propose spe-
cial family-based model checking algorithms. However, they are not applied on
models of variational systems, but on game semantics models extracted from
concrete program fragments with #ifdef-s written in a C-like language.
The first application of game semantics to model checking was proposed by
Ghica and McCusker in [10]. They show how game semantics of IA2 with finite
data-types can be represented in a remarkably simple form by regular-languages.
Subsequently, several algorithms have been proposed for model checking IA2
with infinite integer data types [6,7]. The automata-theoretic representation of
game semantics have been also extended to programs with various features:
concurrency [11], third-order functions [14], probabilistic constructs [13], etc.
To conclude, in this work we introduce the featured symbolic automata
(FSA), a formalism designed to describe the combined game semantics models of
a whole program family. A specifically designed model checking technique allows
to verify safety of an FSA. Thereby, we can verify all products of a family at
once and pinpoint the unsafe products. The proposed approach can be extended
to support multi-features (implemented by arrays) and numeric (non-Boolean)
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features. Another interesting direction for extension would be to apply so-called
variability abstractions [8,9] to define abstract family-based model checking.
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A Proofs
Proof (Theorem 3).
By induction on the structure of M . Apart from #if-term, for all other terms
the proof is immediate from definitions of FSA, A and pik .
Consider the case of #if φ thenM elseM ′. Let k ∈ K. Then by definition
of pik , we have that A[[Γ ` pik (#if φ thenM elseM ′)]] represents either the au-
tomaton for A[[Γ ` pik (M )]] if k |= φ, or the automaton for A[[Γ ` pik (M ′)]] if k |=
¬φ. On the other hand, consider FSA[[Γ `F #if φ thenM elseM ′]] |k . If k |= φ,
all moves associated with M ′ (those tagged with 〈2〉) will be discarded since k 6|=
φ. Thus, we obtain FSA[[Γ `F #if φ thenM elseM ′]] |k= FSA[[Γ `F M ]] |k if
k |= φ. By IH, we have FSA[[Γ `F M ]] |k= A[[Γ ` pik (M )]]. Similarly, we obtain
FSA[[Γ `F #if φ thenM elseM ′]] |k= A[[Γ ` pik (M ′)]] if k |= ¬φ. It follows
that FSA[[Γ `F #if φ thenM elseM ′]] |k= A[[Γ ` pik (#if φ thenM elseM ′)]].
Proof (Theorem 4).
By induction on the structure of M . For all cases except the #if-term, the
proof is immediate corollary from Proposition 1, Theorem 2, and Theorem 3.
Consider the case #if φ thenM elseM ′. Γ ` pik (#if φ thenM elseM ′) is
safe iff either Γ ` pik (M ) is safe when k |= φ, or Γ ` pik (M ′) is safe when
k 6|= φ. By IH, we have Γ ` pik (M ) is safe iff FSA[[Γ `F M ]] |k is safe, and
Γ ` pik (M ′) is safe iff FSA[[Γ `F M ′]] |k is safe. By Definition 1 and similar ar-
guments as in the previous proof, we have FSA[[Γ `F #if φ thenM elseM ′]] |k
is equal either to FSA[[Γ `F M ]] |k if k |= φ, or to FSA[[Γ `F M ′]] |k if
k 6|= φ. Thus, we obtain that Γ ` pik (#if φ thenM elseM ′) is safe iff FSA[[Γ `F
#if φ thenM elseM ′]] |k is safe.
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B FSA for the Linear Search Term Family
0start
1
2
2
2 2 2 222
3
45
6
78
[?I = 0∧?J = 0∧k > 0, run〉
[¬A∧B∧¬C , ?J = J + 1, qy 〉
[¬A∧¬B∧¬C , tt, qy 〉
[A∧¬B∧C , ?J = J + 1∧?J = J + 2, qy 〉
[A∧¬B∧¬C , ?J = J + 1, qy 〉
[¬A∧B∧C , ?J = J − 1∧?J = J + 2, qy 〉
[A∧B∧C , ?J = J + 1∧?J = J − 1∧?J = J + 2, qy 〉
[¬A∧¬B∧C , ?J = J + 2, qy 〉
[A∧B∧¬C , ?J = J + 1∧?J = J − 1, qy 〉
?Yy
?Yy
?Yy
?Yy
?Yy
?Yy
?Yy
?Yy
[tt, ?P = Y ∧ I < k, readx [I ]〉[tt, ?P = Y ∧ I ≥ k, done〉
?
Z
x
[I
]
[tt, P = Z ∧?J = J − 1∧?I = I + 1, readx [I ]〉 [tt, P 6= Z ∧?I = I + 1, readx [I ]〉
[tt, P = Z ∧J = 1, runabort 〉
[tt, ?I = I + 1, doneabort 〉
[tt, I ≥ k, done〉
[tt, I < k, readx [I ]〉
Fig. 7: FSA for the linear search family. Note that all states denoted as 2 are
merged into only one state in the model, but we represent them separately here
in order to aid in the readability of transition labels going from the state 1 to 2.
Also, there is only one transition going from the state 2 to 3.
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